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Will the Real Cable Television Industry
Please Stand Up: The Divergent
Regulatory Treatment of the Cable
Television Industry Prior to the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
by MICHAEL A. MCGREGOR*
I
Introduction
In the Fall of 1984, two leading national news magazines,
Business Week and Newsweek, presented feature stories on the
cable television industry.1 Presumably the magazines had ac-
cess to the same facts, and could have consulted the same ex-
pert sources, but the articles were vastly different in tone and
thesis. The Business Week article, entitled "The Surprising
Success Stories in Cable Television," highlighted the banner
years of many cable television companies.2 Increased revenues,
new services, and heightened customer satisfaction all contrib-
uted to the upbeat article on cable's emergence into the media
mainstream. In contrast, Newsweek ran an article entitled
"Cable's Lost Promise. ' The article described cable as "under-
going an early-life crisis," and noted such facts as the slowdown
in basic cable and pay cable growth, the failure of several pro-
gramming ventures, cable operators' problems in big cities, and
cable programming characterized as "more an echo than a
choice."4 It is difficult to believe that the articles were address-
* B.A., Purdue University, 1973; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1977;
Senior Attorney/Advisor, Mass Media Bureau, Federal Communications Commission,
1980-1983. Presently an assistant professor with the Department of Telecommunica-
tions, Indiana University.
1. The Surprising Success Stories in Cable Television, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 12,
1984, at 81-88 [hereinafter Surprising Success Stories]; Waters & Uehling, Cable's Lost
Promise, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 1984, at 103-05.
2. Surprising Success Stories, supra note 1.
3. Waters & Uehling, supra note 1.
4. Id. at 103.
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ing the same industry.
These conflicting characteristics of the cable television indus-
try are not unique. Other examples of this inconsistent treat-
ment abound. Industry magazines routinely report the latest
tribulations of system operators who have promised too much
during franchise competitions and now find themselves renego-
tiating with suspicious local government officials.- On the
other hand, it is almost impossible to pick up a trade paper and
not find an article on the latest cable programming venture or
system sale.6 The cable industry has prevailed in an impressive
string of law suits, all of which recognize cable's increasing im-
portance and prominence in our system of free expression.7
Yet, the United States Congress saw fit to pass comprehensive
cable legislation which, among other things, views cable as an
industry in need of federal protection.8
John Malone, president of Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI),
the largest cable television operator in the United States, notes
simply that the cable industry is full of paradoxes. 9 Dr. Malone
illustrates this point by citing the fact that stocks for publicly
traded cable companies and the prices paid for systems are at
all-time highs, while on the other hand several major cable
companies have filed for bankruptcy and the backlog of cable
5. See, e.g., Washington Woes, BROADCASTING, June 24, 1985, at 17; Boston Blast,
BROADCASTING, Mar. 11, 1985, at 11. The county government in Montgomery County,
Maryland has notified the county franchisee that it intends to revoke the franchise
and assess monetary penalties in excess of five million dollars for alleged defaults in
the franchise agreement. Montgomery County, Md., puts Pressure on Tribune-
United, BROADCASTING, Nov. 18, 1985, at 99-101.
6. See, e.g., Group W Cable Bidders Log In, BROADCASTING, Oct. 14, 1985, at 30;
What's the SCORE?, BROADCASTING, Sept. 2, 1985, at 8.
7. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied
54 U.S.L.W. 3809 (U.S. June 10, 1986) (No. 85-502); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th
Cir. 1985); Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th
Cir. 1985), affd 54 U.S.L.W. 4542 (U.S. June 3, 1986) (No. 85-390); Tele-Communica-
tions of Key West, Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Community
Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (N.D. Utah 1982); HBO, Inc. v.
Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987 (C.D. Utah 1982).
8. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 152, 224(c)(3), 309(h),
601-639, 705(b-e), 711, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e) (Supp. 1985). Among other things, these
amendments to the Communications Act place limits on the franchise fees that local
governments can assesss cable franchisees (§ 622); severely limit the ability of local
governments to regulate the rates of cable television services in their communities
(§ 623); restrict service and facilities requirements (§ 624); provide for the modifica-
tion of service and facility requirements that cable operators agreed to during the
franchising process (§ 625); and set up intricate franchise renewal procedures (§ 626).
9. Cable's Final Frontier, BROADCASTING, Feb. 4, 1985, at 10.
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equipment orders are at an all-time low.' ° Moreover, adds Ma-
lone, some banks are scared to death of financing cable and
others are "feeling pretty good now.""
This enigmatic perception of the cable industry does not re-
side solely with industry executives and the popular press. The
Federal Communications Commission, in its official opinions,
often characterizes cable television in different ways depending
on the goals the Commission is trying to reach in a particular
proceeding. In attempting to justify the deregulation of other
video media, the Commission often cites cable television as a
strong competitive force in the video marketplace. 2 In other
contexts, however, cable is treated as a minor player in the
video revolution with little real market power.13 The ability of
local government officials to hold cable operators hostage in
bargaining for franchises also is part of the Commission's regu-
lar litany of cable woes.'
4
The purpose of this article is to sort out these apparently in-
consistent characterizations of cable television by the FCC and
analyze the Commission's purposes in making these paradoxi-
cal statements. Whether the Commission's inconsistencies can
be explained in terms of varying regulatory contexts, economic
strength and market power versus programming or opinion di-
versity, for example, will be explored. If no logical dichotomy
exists, the Commission may be engaging in arbitrary and capri-
cious decisionmaking in violation of the commands of proce-
dural due process and the Administrative Procedure Act. 5
Under the rulemaking scheme established in the Administra-
tive Procedure Act,' 6 when Congress delegates policymaking
power to an expert administrative agency, that agency is given
great discretion in its official decisionmaking; reviewing courts
generally do not substitute their policy judgments for the judg-
ments of the agencies." Administrative decisions will be over-
turned only if those decisions exceed the statutory authority of
10. Id
11. Id.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 23-77.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 78-105.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 87-98.
15. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 3105, 3334 (1982).
16. Id.
17. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 948 (D.C. Cir.
1977), affd in part, rev'd in part, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) [hereinafter National Citizens
Comm.].
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the agency or are otherwise arbitrary or capricious.' s The
courts look not only to the ultimate decision of the agency, but
also to the decisionmaking process.' 9 When an agency relaxes
or alters policies or standards, it becomes particularly impor-
tant for the agency to demonstrate that it has taken a hard look
at the salient problems and has genuinely engaged in reasoned
decisionmaking.2 ° In the case of the FCC, the ultimate policy
decision may be reasonable, but the ever changing characteriza-
tions given the cable industry by the Commission negate any
presumption of "reasoned decisionmaking."2 ' Finally, under
the arbitrary and capricious standard, a court must be assured
"that the agency has examined relevant data and has articu-
lated a reasonable explanation for its action, including a 'ra-
tional connection between the facts found and the choices
made.' ,,22 Of course, there is always a rational connection be-
tween facts and decisions when, as the FCC is prone to do, the
agency chooses only those facts that suit desired policy.
II
The FCC's Characterization of the Cable
Industry as a Vigorous Competitor in
the Video Marketplace
The Federal Communications Commission uses the strength
and vitality of the cable television industry to justify many
types of decisions. This positive treatment of the industry is
found not only in the context of decisions directly affecting
18. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984).
19. For example, an agency determination is arbitrary and capricious if the
agency offers an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before
the agency. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). The validity of an agency's determination must be judged
on the basis of the agency's stated reasons for making that determination. Industrial
Union Dept. of the AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 631 n.31
(1980) (plurality opinion). Further, a decision is arbitrary and capricious if the facts
on which the action purportedly is based are not supported by the record. National
Citizens Comm., 555 F.2d at 956.
20. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 671 F.2d 520, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citing
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971)).
21. In another regulatory context, the reliance on contradictory positions in sepa-
rate proceedings was found to be grounds for reversal of the Commission's decision.
Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, 773 F.2d 362, 370-71 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
22. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 734
F.2d 1486, 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371
U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
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cable itself,23 but also the broadcasting industry and various al-
ternative electronic media.24 Both structural and content-based
rules have been amended based on the increased prominence of
cable.
In the area of structural regulations, the increasing competi-
tion faced by broadcasters has been used to justify actual or
proposed changes in the FCC's anti-trafficking regulations,25
the regional concentration of control rules,26 the multiple own-
ership rules,27 and the financial interest and syndication rules.28
The actual discussion of cable in the video marketplace varies
in these documents from one or two phrases to a sizable dis-
course covering several pages.
For example, in the trafficking proceeding, the Commission
noted the increased number of broadcast stations available to
American households. In addition, the Commission stated that
"over-the-air broadcasters face increasing competition from
such newer technologies as cable television and video record-
ings .... In this competitive environment the Commission
found that the public interest would be served best by allowing
station sales transactions to be regulated by market forces.30
Similarly, the growth of the cable industry and the number
of subscribers, and the resultant competition to broadcasters,
was cited as a partial rationale for re-evaluating the regional
concentration of control rules.31 The rules were originally in-
23. See infra notes 44-46, 48-59.
24. See infra notes 26-43, 47, 61-74.
25. Amendment of Section 73.3597 of the Commission's Rules (Applications for
Voluntary Assignments or Transfers of Control), Report and Order in Docket No. 81-
897, 47 Fed. Reg. 55,924, 52 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1081 (1982).
26. Repeal of the "Regional Concentration of Control" Provisions of the Commis-
sion's Multiple Ownership Rules, Report and Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 578 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Regional Concentration of Control Repeal].
27. Amendment of Section 75.3555 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multi-
ple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 100
F.C.C.2d 17 (1984), recon. granted in part and denied in part, 100 F.C.C.2d 74 (1985).
28. Amendment of 47 C.F.R. Section 73.658(j)(1)(i) and (ii), the Syndication and
Financial Interest Rules, Tentative Decision and Request for Further Comments, 94
F.C.C.2d 1019 (1983).
29. Amendment of Section 73.3597 of the Commission's Rules (Applications for
Voluntary' Assignments or Transfers of Control), Report and Order in Docket No. 81-
897, 47 Fed. Reg. 55,927, para. 22, 52 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1082, para. 22 (1982). In
order to prevent trafficking in broadcast licenses, these rules required a hearing when
an entity desired to assign or transfer a broadcast license within three years of acquir-
ing it. Id. at para. 1, 52 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1082, para. 1.
30. Id. at para. 23, 52 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1082, para. 23.
31. Regional Concentration of Control Repeal, supra note 26. With certain excep-
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tended to promote enhancement of diversity of viewpoints on a
regional level. According to the majority, "the significant
growth in media outlets in recent years clearly constitutes a
substantive change in circumstances that strongly suggests a
need to re-evaluate our assumptions on setting regional owner-
ship constraints. '32 The Commission concluded that as the
number of competing voices in a region rises, the potential in-
fluence of commonly owned outlets declines.33
The Commission again emphasized diversity of viewpoints
when it modified the multiple ownership rules, commonly
known as the 7-7-7 rule or the rule of sevens. 4 In that decision,
the Commission discussed the increasingly competitive market-
place, including the role of cable in that market. The Commis-
sion concluded that
in terms of viewpoint diversity, the market includes a wide va-
riety of active, energetic organs engaged in the dissemination
of ideas and that these instruments include not simply televi-
sion and radio, but also cable, VCRs, newspapers, magazines,
books, and, when they are in operation, MDS, STV, LPTV, and
DBS, all of which should be considered when evaluating diver-
sity concerns.35
Congress evidently disagreed with this analysis to a certain ex-
tent, as evidenced by the pressure put on the Commission to
revise the outcome reached in the multiple ownership
proceeding.3 6
tions, these rules prohibited the common ownership, operation or control of three
commercial AM, FM, or TV stations where any two were located within 100 miles of
the third and there was a defined level of service overlap between any of the stations.
Id. at para. 1.
32. Id. at para. 20.
33. Id.
34. Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636] of
the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television
Broadcast Stations, Report and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17 (1984) [hereinafter Amend-
ment of Section 73.3555], recon. granted in part and denied in part, 100 F.C.C.2d 74
(1985) [hereinafter Amendment of Section 73.3555 Reconsidered]. The multiple own-
ership rules limited to seven the number of AM, FM, and TV stations that any one
entity could own, operate, or control. Id. at para. 2.
35. Amendment of Section 73.3555, supra note 34, at para. 30.
36. Originally, the Commission replaced the "rule of sevens" with a "rule of
twelves." Id. at para. 108. The 12-12-12 rule would have automatically expired in six
years, leaving no multiple ownership restrictions. Id. at para. 110. Due in part to
significant Congressional pressure (See Amendment of Section 73.3555 Reconsidered,
supra note 34, at para. 39), the Commission later amended the "rule of twelves" with
respect to television ownership by adding an audience coverage limitation which pro-
vides, with certain exceptions, that television stations owned or controlled by any one
entity may not aggregately cover more than twenty-five percent of the nation's televi-
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One of the longest and most detailed expositions on the
growth, strength, and diversity of cable is contained in the Ten-
tative Decision regarding proposed changes in the network fi-
nancial interest and syndication rules." Fully thirteen
paragraphs containing countless facts and figures (including
four charts) describe the cable industry of yesterday and today.
Included in the analysis are discussions of advertiser-supported
and pay cable networks, revenue and income levels, and future
growth projections. 8 The Commission's characterizations of
cable describe a strong, growing, and diverse industry, the
power of which must be considered when deciding the fate of
restrictive regulations affecting other industries.
In the Tentative Decision, the Commission highlighted the
fact that cable networks are now producing a significant
amount of original programming.3 9 The Tentative Decision
used data showing that Home Box Office and Showtime cur-
rently produce over thirty percent of their own shows, that
Daytime uses only original programming, and that fifty percent
of the product on Nickelodeon is original.4" The Commission
noted that between 1985 and 1990 the program expenditures of
the cable industry are expected to exceed the combined televi-
sion network program expenditures.41 The Commission found
it "telling" that the proportion of video product purchased, by
the networks has recently reached a low of fifty-four percent
from a high of seventy-four percent several years ago.42 This
indicates the concomitant rise in the purchasing power of other
video media, including cable and pay cable programmers.43
The status of cable in the United States has helped bolster
changes in content-related regulations as well as the Commis-
sion households. Id. The Commission also deleted the automatic "sunset" provision,
so that now any changes in the rules must be accomplished through normal rulemak-
ing procedures. See id. at para. 49.
37. Amendment of 47 C.F.R. Section 73.658(j)(1)(i) and (ii), the Syndication and
Financial Interest Rules, Tentative Decision and Request for Further Comments, 94
F.C.C.2d 1019, paras. 109-21 (1983). The financial interest and syndication rules limit
the abilities of the three commercial television networks to syndicate programming in
the United States and to obtain ownership interests in the programming that airs on
their networks. Id. at paras. 1-7.
38. Id, at paras. 109-21.
39. Id. at para. 117.
40. Id.
41. Id. at para. 119.
42. Id. at para. 179.
43. Id.
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sion's structural regulations. The application of the fairness
doctrine and the political broadcasting rules,44 cable service
tiering,45 the cable must-carry rules, 46 and commercial televi-
sion licensee program obligations 4 have all been affected in
some way by the Commission's perception of the cable
industry.
In its 1983 Notice of Proposed Rule Making, the Commission,
noting the increasing growth and sophistication of contempo-
rary cable television systems, questioned the continued applica-
tion of the fairness doctrine and the political access laws to
cable operations.48 In passing, the Commission admitted that
the majority of systems then in existence had relatively limited
channel capacities. 49 But the Commission pointed out that new
systems under construction would have channel capacities in
the range of thirty-five, fifty, or even one hundred channels,
and that many existing systems with small channel capacities
were being rebuilt with greater capacities.5 0 According to the
Commission, these facts reflect a trend away from broadcast
signal carriage and toward non-broadcast programming. 51 Be-
cause of this phenomenon, the FCC stated that "cable systems
44. Fairness Doctrine and Political Cablecasting Requirements for Cable Televi-
sion Systems, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in MM Docket No. 83-331, FCC 83-130,
48 Fed. Reg. 26,472, 6 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) (1983) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R.
§§ 76.205, .209) [hereinafter Fairness Doctrine for Cable].
45. Many cable television operators offer their services in tiers or discrete levels
of service. For example, the first service tier may consist of twelve channels and cost
$5.95, the second tier might include twenty channels for $8.95, and a third tier of
thirty channels might be sold for $10.95. Obviously, the decision as to which services
to place on what tier can be very important to subscribers and local government offi-
cials. The Commission recently recognized that federal regulation pre-empts the
power of local governments to regulate the rates for tiered services beyond the lowest
basic tier. Community Cable TV, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d
1204 (1984) [hereinafter Community Cable TV].
46. See Petition for Rule Making to Delete the Cable Television Mandatory Sig-
nal Carriage Rules, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1365
(1984) [hereinafter Petition to Delete Mandatory Carriage Rules], vacated sub nom.
on other grounds, Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied 54 U.S.L.W. 3809 (U.S. June 10, 1986) (No. 85-502).
47. See The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertain-
ment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Sta-
tions, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 94 F.C.C.2d 678 (1984) [hereinafter Revision of
Programming Policies Proposal]; Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter Revision of Programming Policies Order].
48. Fairness Doctrine for Cable, supra note 44.
49. Id. at para. 24.
50. Id.
51. Id. at para. 25.
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and their subscribers have access to an extremely rich and di-
vergent mix of program and information services."52
More channel capacity, according to the Commission, pro-
vides increased opportunities for new degrees of diversity on
the local level through access availability. The Commission ap-
plauded this access availability and expected that it would "con-
tribute further toward diversity in the marketplace of ideas and
the fostering of 'uninhibited, robust and wide-open' debate on
public issues in the community. '53 The Commission implicitly
suggested that cable's obvious abundance of usable channels,
together with the willingness of cable operators to provide ac-
cess in the absence of FCC -mandates, might obviate the need
for content regulation such as the fairness doctrine and the
political access laws.
54
In its decision permitting cable operators to re-tier their serv-
ices in order to avoid local rate regulation, the Commission con-
tinued its glowing characterization of the cable industry.55 In
pre-empting rate regulation of non-mandatory signals, the FCC
opined that restrictive rate regulation might stifle innovation.
The reasoning continued:
Today, the degree of diversity in satellite delivered program
services reflects the wisdom of freeing cable systems from bur-
densome state and local regulation in this area. So called "pre-
mium" offerings such as HBO, Showtime, and The Movie
Channel, along with narrowcast channels such as Christian
Broadcasting Network, Nickelodeon, and Black Entertainment
Television manifest the rich variety available to cable subscrib-
ers under a policy of nonbasic preemption.56
This "rich variety" provided the rationale for the Commission's
decision to let "the marketplace function freely.
5 7
Cable's increasing prominence in the video marketplace
52. Id.
53. Id. at para. 26. Interestingly, only twelve paragraphs later, the Commission
tacitly concedes that few people may make use of or watch access programming. Id. at
para. 38. Given this realization, the notion that access availability will somehow foster
the marketplace of ideas appears disingenuous.
54. Fairness Doctrine for Cable, supra note 44, at paras. 26-27.
55. Community Cable TV, supra note 45.
56. Id. at para. 17
57. Id. at para. 17. Despite the industry's ability to provide this "rich variety" of
services, however, the Commission admitted that the market for cablecast services is
not now mature and that protective pre-emption is still needed to keep cable competi-
tive with other developing services "most of which enjoy great pricing flexibility." Id.
at para. 19.
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helped justify the Commission's decision to reject a challenge
to its must-carry cable rules.58 The Commission admitted that
the must-carry rules, which required cable television operators
to carry specified broadcast stations on their systems, were an-
ticompetitive and arguably thwarted the desires of those cable
subscribers who would prefer non-broadcast programming. 9
However, two significant changes in the cable industry-the
growth in system channel capacity and the growth in cable sub-
scribership-supported the Commission's conviction that the
time for relaxation of the must-carry rules had not yet arrived.
These two changes made mandatory carriage less burdensome
but increased the impact of noncarriage on local broadcasters.
The Commission chose not to amend the rules, "given the radi-
cal shift in competitive relationships between the broadcast and
cable television industries" that such changes would induce.6
Over-the-air subscription broadcasters benefitted (although
probably too little and too late) from the increased competitive-
ness of cable through the FCC deregulation of subscription tel-
evision operations." The staff compared the advantages and
58. Petition to Delete Mandatory Carriage Rules, supra note 46. The Commis-
sion's mandatory carriage or "must-carry" rules required cable operators to carry cer-
tain broadcast signals on their systems. The rules were designed to insure that local
stations would be carried on cable systems located within the broadcast station's pri-
mary service area. See former signal carriage rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-.65 (1984). The
FCC suspended enforcement of these rules pending final action by the Supreme
Court in Quincy Cable TV, 54 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Sept. 23, 1985) (No. 85-502). Cable
Television Service, Notice of Suspension of Certain Rules, 50 Fed. Reg. 38,003 (1985).
59. Petition to Delete Mandatory Carriage Rules, supra note 46, at para. 7.
60. Id. at para. 8. Here is a rare example of cable's prosperity actually being used
against the cable industry, to the benefit of broadcasters. Of course, in the early years
of cable regulation, the industry faced extensive regulation in order to protect over-
the-air television. The decision not to amend the must-carry rules also represents one
of the few times that the FCC has chosen not to deregulate when given the opportu-
nity. Obviously, the Commission was not terribly comfortable with its decision to
maintain the must-carry rules, as evidenced by its decision not to appeal the D.C.
Circuit Court's decision in Quincy Cable TV that declared the must-carry rules uncon-
stitutional. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985). A majority
of the Commissioners were content to leave the issue buried, but intense Congres-
sional pressure eventually led the Commission to adopt a Notice of Inquiry and Pro-
posed Rule Making to consider whether some type of must carry rule could be
formulated that would meet constitutional constraints. Amendment of Part 76 of the
Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage of Television Broadcast Signals by Cable
Television Systems, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making in MM Docket No.
85-349, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,232 (released Nov. 18, 1985). Since certiorari was denied in
Quincy Cable TV, the Commission has adopted new must-carry rules, yet to be pub-
licly released in final form, which it believes comply with constitutional require-
ments. FCC Public Meeting, August 6, 1986.
61. Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations in Regard
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disadvantages of each pay programming delivery system plus
the capital and operating costs of the various systems. The
study concluded that cable delivery has significant advantages
over delivery via over-the-air subscription broadcasting. These
competitive advantages plus the growth of pay cable provided
the Commission with compelling reasons for removing many of
the restrictions on STV operations.62
Much significance has been made of the strength and com-
petitiveness of the cable programming industry. According to
the Commission:
The video program markets supplying programming for
cable television use are highly competitive, entry does not ap-
pear to be unusually restricted,... and there are a significant
number of potential competitors remaining at the edge of the
market maintaining a credible possibility of additional compe-
tition if existing participants slack in their competitive vigor.63
Ten years after the Commission established its special pro-
gramming obligations with respect to children's television, it
deleted its children's policies after finding that the video mar-
ketplace adequately served the programming needs of youth.64
The majority in the "kidvid" proceeding noted that "[c]able tel-
evision now passes some fifty-four percent of all homes and
cannot be avoided in any assessment of the accessibility of pro-
gramming to the child audience. '65 Crucial to the Commis-
sion's decision in that proceeding was the development of
market data showing that electronic media other than commer-
cial broadcasting could be counted on to provide informational
children's programming. The majority found "increased view-
ing options provided to substantial portions of the population
by the operation of cable television systems. '6 6 Cited in the
Commission's analysis of the market for children's television
were cable services such as Kidstime, Nickelodeon, and the Dis-
ney Channel. 7
to Section 73.642(a)(3) and Other Aspects of the Subscription Television Service,
Third Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 341 (1982).
62. Id. at paras. 22-24.
63. Teleprompter Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 89 F.C.C.2d 417, para.
22 (1982).
64. Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices, Report and
Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 634 (1984).
65. Id. at para. 30.
66. Id. at para. 32.
67. Id. at para. 30.
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The role played by cable in the video universe was greatly
emphasized in the Commission documents proposing and im-
plementing television deregulation. In the television deregu-
lation Notice of Proposed Rule Making, fully thirteen
paragraphs were devoted to the video marketplace. The com-
petitiveness of the market was raised by the Commission in at
least five different contexts.69
Given this increasingly competitive market, the Commission
opined that subjecting broadcasters to such regulations might
impede their ability to compete with unregulated or less regu-
lated technologies.70 For example, the Commission noted that
the local, news, and nonentertainment guidelines that guided
broadcasters in their choice of programming did not apply to
cable operators,7 nor was cable burdened with ascertainment,
program log, or commercialization policies.72 The Commission
concluded:
Given the fact that competing technologies and emerging de-
livery systems are unlikely to be burdened by programming re-
strictions, it may not be in the public interest to continue a
regimen of comprehensive program regulation for commercial
television broadcasters. Such unequal treatment may result in
an increasing inability to compete with other technologies and
may provide a disincentive for commercial television broad-
casters to experiment and innovate in their programming.7 3
The Commission later deleted its commercialization, logging,
ascertainment, and programming guidelines, using almost the
68. See The Revision of Programming Policies Proposal, supra note 47; Revision
of Programming Policies Order, supra note 47.
69. The video marketplace is first described in order to provide background infor-
mation. Id. at paras. 27-32. Next, the increasingly competitive nature of the video
market is cited as possibly impeding the "ability of commercial television licensees to
compete with other, unregulated or less regulated technologies." Id. at para 35. The
rules relating to news and public affairs programs are questioned; the Commission
notes that broadcasters are voluntarily expanding their news and public affairs com-
mitments in the face of increasing competition from emerging technologies. Id. at
para. 45. The elimination of ascertainment obligations is justified "because the video
marketplace now is workably competitive, [and] commercial broadcasters are forced
continually to ascertain community needs and interests." Id. at para. 55. Commercial-
ization guidelines, it is argued, can be eliminated because "competition within the
video marketplace will serve as an adequate regulator of commercialization." Id. at
para. 58.
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same rationale as stated in the Notice.74
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the vitality of the
cable television industry in the United States is frequently cited
by the FCC as justification for deregulating not only the cable
industry, but other electronic media as well. Given the growth
of the cable industry in numbers of systems, subscribers, pro-
gramming networks, revenues, and its ability to compete with
older, more established delivery systems, one would expect a
minimum of cable regulation or protective legislation.75 This is
not the case, however, as is evidenced by the protections in-
cluded in the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,76 the
compulsory copyright license granted cable systems,77 and the
continuing paternalistic attitude shown cable by the FCC. The
following section documents this FCC paternalism.
III
The FCC's Characterization of the Cable
Television Industry as a Weak and
Vulnerable Competitor in the
Video Marketplace
In justifying its protective treatment of cable, the Federal
Communications Commission paints a much different image of
the cable industry. Prior to the court decision declaring the
must-carry rules unconstitutional, 8 the Commission decided a
74. Revision of Programming Policies Proposal, supra note 47; Revision of Pro-
gramming Policies Order, supra note 47.
75. Protective treatment is not inherently undesirable. Nascent technologies oc-
casionally may need such regulatory protection in order to compete with established
entities. For example, given the sudden rush to scramble satellite-delivered video
programming, the home satellite industry may be the type of industry that requires
some type of regulatory assistance, at least until home descramblers are readily avail-
able. Congress is considering this matter, and several bills currently are pending to
provide temporary relief to home dish owners. See Satellite Viewing Rights Act, H.R.
1840, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); Satellite Television Viewing Rights Act, S. 1618, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
76. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 152, 224(c)(3),
309(h), 601-639, 705(b-e), 711 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e) (Supp. 1985).
77. The compulsory license permits cable operators to carry distant broadcast sig-
nals in return for the payment of a prescribed copyright royalty fee based on system
size and revenue. 17 U.S.C. § 111(c) (1982).
78. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985) cert. denied 54
U.S.L.W. 3809 (U.S. June 10, 1986) (No. 85-502) (regulations requiring cable operators,
on request and without compensation, to transmit to their subscribers every over-the-
air television broadcast signal that was "significantly viewed in the community" vio-
lated the first amendment).
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number of must-carry issues concerning cable carriage of "an-
cillary" broadcast signals.79 In each case, the FCC denied must-
carry status to the ancillary services."0 This result is consistent
with the Commission's marketplace policies, but curious rea-
soning has often accompanied the marketplace rationale.
For example, in the decision denying must-carry status to
subscription television, the Commission found "no evidence...
that cable carriage [was] fundamental to the survival or eco-
nomic success of STV.'s This conclusion is surprising since the
opposite conclusion was one basis for the Commission's adop-
tion and retention of must-carry regulations for traditional lo-
cal broadcast stations.82 In the earlier decision, the Commission
specifically stated that local stations should not be denied ac-
cess to the audiences the broadcaster is licensed to serve. No
explanation for the dichotomous treatment of subscription sta-
tions and traditional stations was given. The Commission also
reasoned that must-carry status would have provided a "costly
redundancy of transmission paths" for STV. 3 Again, the deci-
sion offered no reasons why this was any different from other
must-carry rules. Finally, must-carry status was denied be-
cause such STV carriage might cause a substantial burden on
cable operators.8 4 One might think that the vital industry de-
scribed in the preceding section of this article surely would be
able to survive the strain.
In the decision establishing the low power television ser-
79. Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations to Require
Cable Television Carriage of Certain Subscription Television Signals, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 77 F.C.C.2d 523 (1980) [hereinafter Amendment to Part 76]; An
Inquiry into the Future Role of Low Power Television Broadcasting and Television
Translators in the National Telecommunications System, Report and Order in BC
Docket No. 78-253, FCC 82-107, 47 Fed. Reg. 21,468, as corrected in 47 Fed. Reg. 30,495,
51 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 476 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Inquiry into LPTV's Future
Role]; Amendment of Parts 2, 73 and 76 of the Commission's Rules to Authorize the
Transmission of Teletext by TV Stations, Report and Order, 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F)
1309, paras. 33-39 (1983); The Use of Subcarrier Frequencies in the Aural Baseband of
Television Transmitters, Second Report and Order, 55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1642,
paras. 17-27 (1984).
80. See supra notes 76-79.
81. Amendment of Part 76, supra note 79, at para. 9.
82. See, e.g., Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, paras. 78-87
(1972); New Milford Cablevision Co., Petition for Special Relief, 52 RAD. REG. 2d (P &
F) 617, para. 5; Big Valley Cablevision, Inc., Petitions for Special Relief and Forfei-
ture, 56 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 429, para. 9.
83. Amendment of Part 76, supra note 79, at para. 78.
84. Amendment of Part 76, supra note 79, at para. 11.
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vice,85 low power stations were not accorded must-carry status
because the Commission believed that cable operators, relying
on marketplace forces, should decide for themselves what sig-
nals to carry. That is entirely consistent with marketplace pol-
icy. The Commission went further, however, and stated that
with respect to saturated cable systems (systems serving areas
with more must-carry signals than available system channel ca-
pacity), those operators "should not be required to make the
hard choice between the low power signal and other program-
ming for which [their] subscribers may indicate demand.
' 86
Those "hard choices" are part of operating any competitive
business, but the Commission saw fit to insulate the cable
industry.
Further evidence of the Commission's paternalistic attitude
toward the cable industry lies in the FCC's enforcement of its
former franchise fee limitation."' The rule limited the fees that
local governments could levy against cable operators in return
for the operators' use of the public rights of way. The Commis-
sion justified this limitation by stating that high franchise fees
amounted to nothing more than an oppressive tax on cable sub-
scribers and a significant burden on both cable operators and
the development of the industry as a whole. Such excessive
fees, opined the Commission, "imped[ed the cable industry's]
ability to play an unfettered role in our overriding national
telecommunications market."""
The cable industry used the Commission's rule to its benefit.
In the heat of franchise competitions, cable operators often
promised local governments fees in excess of the Commission's
guidelines, and underplayed the FCC's role in enforcing the
limitations. Following receipt of the franchise, the operator
would tell the local officials that an FCC waiver was required
and would leave the local government to its own devices in
85. Inquiry into LPTV's Future Role, supra note 79.
86. Id. at paras. 111-12, 51 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) at 521.
87. Former rule 76.31, 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1984), was deleted following the passage
of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 152, 224(c)(3), 309(h),
601-639, 705 (b)-(e), 711 (1962) 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(e) (Supp 1985); Amendment to
Parts 1, 63 and 76 of the Commission's Rules to Implement the Provisions of the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, Report and Order in MM Docket No. 84-1296,
FCC 85-179, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637, 58 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1, paras. 86-90 (adopted Apr.
19, 1985).
88. Cable Television Franchise Fee Compliance, 55 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 896, 896-
97 (1984).
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seeking the waiver.8 9 When community officials were unable
to provide the substantial documentation required by the Com-
mission, the waiver petitions were denied.90 This process in ef-
fect let cable companies use Commission processes to get out of
agreements with local officials entered into in good faith.
Ironically, the Commission regulation interferes with the
marketplace so revered by the current commission.9' If cable
operators agree during competitive bidding to pay a certain
franchise fee, presumably those companies can set their sub-
scription rates so as to raise enough revenue to cover those fees.
If the local government demands an unreasonably high
franchise fee, cable companies can either refuse to bid on a
franchise or mount a publicity campaign informing the commu-
nity's citizens that the excessive fees ultimately will be paid by
subscribers. Rather than letting this market work, however,
the Commission preferred to protect the industry from the po-
tential excesses of the franchising process-excesses exacer-
bated by the cable industry itself in its zeal to obtain new
franchises.
Further protection of the industry came in the Commission's
Nevada 92 decision allowing cable operators to restructure their
basic channel offerings to avoid local rate regulation.93 Tradi-
tionally, local governments have had the discretion to regulate
the rates cable television companies charged for basic cable
services.94 In the Nevada decision, however, the Commission
redefined "basic" cable service to include only must-carry
89. An example of such an occurrence is documented in the legislative history of
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984. See 130 CONG. REC. H12241-44 (daily
ed. Oct. 11, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
90. This interference is continued in the provisions of the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, which limits franchise fees to five percent of a system's gross reve-
nues. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (Supp. 1985).
91. Community Cable TV, supra note 45.
92. Id. at paras. 18-19, 21.
93. See, e.g., Warner Communications of Pittsburgh, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 53 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 991, para. 4 (1983).
94. Indeed, the initial cable television rules required local governments to regu-
late basic service rates. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.31(a)(4) (1973). The Commission later de-
leted the rate regulation requirement, finding that local authorities should be
permitted to decide for themselves whether to regulate rates. Rules and Regulations
of Cable Television System Regular Subscriber Rates, Report and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d
672, para. 21 (1976). The regulation of the rates of nonbasic services, that is, pay cable
channels and programming, alarm systems, and digital services has long been pre-
empted by the FCC. See Clarification of the Cable Television Rules and Notice of
Proposed Rule Making and Inquiry, 46 F.C.C.2d 175, para. 85 (1974); Brookhaven
Cable TV, Inc. v. Kelly, 428 F. Supp. 1216 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
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broadcast signals and required access channels. " This meant
that only those service tiers filled exclusively with must-carry
broadcast signals and access channels could be rate regulated
by local governments. Other services, traditionally offered as
part of a basic service package (e.g., CNN, ESPN, WTBS, USA
Network) could be placed in other service tiers insulated from
local regulation. This could be done at the sole discretion of the
cable operator, regardless of any promises made to the
franchising authority regarding levels and pricing of services
that the operator would offer. The Commission's action was
justified to "preclude artificial and unnecessary skewing of the
market that nonfederal regulation of entry and price could
produce." 96
Again, the Commission essentially relieved the cable indus-
try from responsibility for promises made to local governments
with respect to basic cable services. In fact, the Commission's
action allows cable operators to void contract commitments at
will. Protective regulation of an industry as strong as the one
characterized by the Commission in other proceedings calls
into question the Commission's blind devotion to the
marketplace.
The Commission's pronouncements about the state of the in-
dustry have not always been made in the context of protection-
ism. Contrary to many statements made in other proceedings,
the Commission has been obliged to admit in some instances
that the cable programming market is weak and fluctuating.
The Commission has stated that "[p]lainly, the market for
cablecast video services is still volatile and rapidly changing in
response not only to the specialized programming needs of
cable subscribers but also to new competitive challengers in the
overall video services market. ' 97 Recent programming devel-
opments show that the market for cablecast services is not yet
mature. As examples, the Commission cited the fates of CBS
Cable, the Entertainment Channel, and Satellite News
Network.98
Recognizing that most cable operators frequently are not di-
rectly involved in the production of programming, the FCC, in
deciding not to promulgate multiple ownership standards for
95. Community Cable TV, supra note 45, at paras. 16-17.
96. Id. at para. 20.
97. Id at para. 19.
98. Id. at n.25.
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cable, concluded that cable's leading firms would be far down
the list of national "opinion molders." '99 The majority added
that "[e]ven the nationally distributed cable networks ... are
having some difficulties accumulating an audience sufficient to
be reflected in the data available from the national audience
rating firms."100 Yet this is the same industry whose strength
in program acquisition put commercial broadcast networks in a
disadvantaged competitive position and whose children's pro-
gramming helped justify the deregulation of commercial broad-
casters' children's television obligations.101
The Commission has long attempted to stimulate diverse pro-
gramming through encouraging diverse ownership of electronic
media.0 2 Recognizing that minorities are underrepresented in
cable television ownership, the Commission concluded that di-
versity of ownership cannot effectively operate as a means of
ensuring that the views of minorities are reflected in program-
99. Amendment of Part 76, Subpart J of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Relative to Diversification of Control of Community Antenna Television Systems;
and Inquiry with Respect thereto to Formulate Regulatory Policy and Rule Making
and/or Legislative Proposals, Report and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 46, para. 10 (1982).
100. Id. at n.8.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43, 64-67. Interestingly, in the proceed-
ing involving the proposed modifications to the financial interest and syndication
rules, most commentators took the position that the effects of cable on the program
acquisition markets were negligible. For example, Cox Broadcasting (also an MSO)
suggested that by 1990 combined pay cable shares would be no larger than nine per-
cent. Amendment of 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)(1)(i) and (ii), the Syndication and Financial
Interest Rules, 94 F.C.C.2d 1019, para. 72 (1983). The National Association of In-
dependent Television Program Programmers and Distributors stated that the net-
works' loss in share was due to inroads made by independent television stations, not
cable programmers. Id. The Association of National Advertisers asserted that compe-
tition from new technologies (including cable) was illusory and that advertiser-sup-
ported cable networks account for only one percent of all television ad revenues. Id.
MCA and the Association of Program Distributors indicate that cable is not a domi-
nant force in the acquisition of entertainment series. Id.
102. In addition to the Commission's generic rules covering broadcast multiple
ownership (47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1984)) and cable cross-ownership (47 C.F.R. § 76.501
(1984)), many rules and policies have been established specifically to encourage mi-
nority ownership of broadcasting and cable properties. Such policies and rules in-
clude issuing tax certificates, awarding preferences in comparative hearings and
lotteries, and waiving ownership rules. See Petition for Issuance of Policy Statement
or Notice of Inquiry by National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 69 F.C.C.2d 1591 (1978); Commission Policy
Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broadcasting, Policy State-
ment and Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Gen. Docket No. 82-797, FCC 82-523, 48
Fed. Reg. 5976, 52 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1301 (1982); Policy Statement on Minority
Ownership of Cable Television Facilities, 52 RAD. REG. 2d (P & F) 1469 (1982).
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ming decisions for cable systems.103  The Commission
continued:
[B]ecause cable television system operators exercise editorial
discretion with respect to broadcast program selection and
cable origination programming, insensitivity on their part to
minority issues and viewpoints could undercut our continuing
efforts to increase the diversity of viewpoints in programming.
Thus, despite our previous efforts to ensure program diversity,
it appears that additional measures in the area of cable televi-
sion are appropriate. °4
Thus, in at least this one context, the Commission has been
forced to admit that the purveyor of programming diversity is
doing little to provide that diversity.
Finally, in several proceedings the Commission has at-
tempted to dispel any notion that the cable television industry
possesses any real market power.05 While this may be true,
and clearly this alone does not imply that the cable industry is a
vital one, the Commission's discussions in these dockets tend to




Like all government agencies, the Federal Communications
Commission is expected to regulate in the public interest and
do so in a manner that is not arbitrary and capricious. 0 But
the foregoing analysis indicates that regulatory caprice runs
rampant with respect to the cable television industry. One day
the industry is a tower of strength and competitive vigor; the
next day (or, on occasion, in the same document!) 0 7 the indus-
try needs the regulatory protection of the Commission to keep
103. Policy Statement on Minority Ownership of Cable Television Facilities, supra
note 103, at 1471.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., CBS, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 587 (1981)
(network/cable cross-ownership rules waived to permit CBS to own cable systems);
Diversification of Control of Community Antenna Television Systems, Report and
Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 46, paras. 7-9 (multiple ownership rules for cable systems not
adopted).
106. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d
458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (actions taken pursuant to informal rulemaking subject to the
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"
standard of review).
107. As indicated in the text, varying characterizations of the cable industry can be
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its head above water. Conceivably, these distinctions might be
consistent if applied in differing contexts: a strong industry in
terms of economic analysis, but a fledgling industry in terms of
viewpoint and programming diversity. Unfortunately, no such
logical pattern emerges from the Commission's decisions.
When the Commission focuses on economic or market
strength, the industry for the most part is portrayed positively.
In many situations, the strength of the industry puts other me-
dia at an economic disadvantage. These arguments have accom-
panied the decisions involving the financial interest and
syndication rules,' the trafficking rule,10 9 subscription televi-
sion deregulation, 1 0 and the generic television deregulation
proceeding."'
In other contexts, especially cable's dealings with local gov-
ernments, the industry appears to be one that needs protection
from the give and take of the marketplace. The industry as a
whole does not have the power to stand up against the some-
times unreasonable demands of franchising authorities. In
those situations, the Commission (and Congress) seems only
too happy to bail out cable systems that make unwise deals.
The Commission's intervention in local government relations
ultimately only skews the balance of power between the con-
tracting parties. Examples of this regulatory treatment are
found in the Commission's franchise fee opinions 1 2 and the Ne-
vada decision." 3 Other indications that cable operators should
sometimes be insulated from the realities of the marketplace
are found in the curious statements made by the Commission in
various must-carry decisions.
114
Similarly divergent treatments abound in the Commission's
discourses on cable and its impact on first amendment values.
For example, statements to the effect that the existence of
cable promotes viewpoint diversity can be found in the Com-
mission's regional concentration of control decision," 5 the mul-
found in the opinions concerning the service re-tiering decision (supra note 92); and
the national multiple ownership policy decision (supra note 100).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
110. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 68-74.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 92-98.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 78-86.
115. See supra note 26 and text accompanying notes 31-33.
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tiple ownership documents 116 and the fairness doctrine notice
of proposed rulemaking.117 Conversely, indications of cable's
minimal role in the marketplace of ideas are present in the
cable multiple ownership decision11 8 and the minority owner-
ship proceeding. 119 The Commission has apparently taken to
heart Ralph Waldo Emerson's admonition that "a foolish con-
sistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." Regrettably, the
Commission cannot distinguish between "foolish" consistencies
and important, even legally required, consistencies.
Ironically, the Commission may be acting arbitrarily and ca-
priciously for no reason. In many instances, the Commission
could have taken the actions it did without resorting to incon-
sistent characterizations of the cable industry. Independent
regulatory agencies legally may change their policies and regu-
lations even when there have been no intervening changes in
circumstances. 20 The courts recognize that the underlying phi-
losophies of newly constituted commissions differ, and that a
commission's view of what best serves the public interest
changes from time to time.121 Accordingly, assuming its actions
do not otherwise violate the law, the Commission can change
communications policy if, in its expert judgment, the new pol-
icy better serves the public interest. The Commission need not
rely on divergent characterizations of the cable industry to bol-
ster the policy changes it is making.
Without a doubt, the FCC has displayed little or no consis-
tency in its public characterizations of the cable television in-
dustry. The only conclusion that can be drawn from the
foregoing discussion is that the Commission is engaging in bla-
tantly result-oriented decisionmaking. Although one might ar-
gue that the results reached by the Commission have been
reasonable, the means used to reach those results most cer-
tainly are not. In many cases, the Commission could take its
proposed actions without constructing makeweight arguments
about the stability of the cable industry. If the FCC continues
116. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 103-104.
120. Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. de-
nied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956). See also Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
121. Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d at 206; Action for Children's Tele-
vision v. FCC, 756 F.2d 899, 901 (D.C. Cir 1985).
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its present contradictory course, it must realize that these offi-
cial flip-flops undermine its credibility and call into question
the legality of resulting decisions. Individuals and media orga-
nizations interested in accountable public decisionmaking
should encourage the Commission to review its past statements
and attempt to espouse a consistent view of the cable television
industry in future decisions.
Just as a casual reader of the Newsweek and Business Week
articles mentioned at the outset would have some difficulty
identifying the real cable industry, so would someone reading
the Commission's pronouncements. The paradoxes continue,
fueled not only by the popular press and the industry itself, but
by the contradictory findings of the government's "expert"
agency. Perhaps in the near future a clearer picture of the
cable industry will emerge. In the meantime, however, media
watchers might yet ask, "Will the real cable television industry
please stand up?"
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